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We largely agree with Grimwade et al’s1 
conclusion that challenge trial participants 
may ethically be paid, including for risk. 
Here, we add further arguments, clarify 
some points from the perspective of 
economics and indicate areas where 
(behavioural) economists can support the 
development of a framework for ethically 
justifiable payment. Our arguments apply 
to carefully constructed and monitored 
controlled human infection model 
(CHIM) trials that have been appropri-
ately reviewed and approved.
Participants in medical studies perform 
a service. Outside the domain of research 
participation, there is nearly universal 
agreement that workers providing a service 
should be compensated fairly, and that 
work involving more discomfort and risk 
should be compensated more generously. 
Accordingly, labour regulations impose 
floors (minimum wage laws), not caps on 
compensation. Caps, even if intended to 
protect against undue inducement, also 
raise concerns about illegal price- fixing 
that disadvantages workers. Such limits on 
payment for egg donors have successfully 
been challenged in court.i
Moreover, caps on compensation may 
harm everyone at risk of infection, not 
just potential participants. Insufficient 
compensation may impede the recruit-
ment of enough suitable subjects, for 
example, when representativeness of 
the subject sample is required. Delays in 
vaccine development not only prolong 
disruption of social, educational and 
economic activity but also lead to excess 
infections and deaths. Unlike paid CHIM 
participants, individuals exposed to such 
infection do not accept it voluntarily, are 
not compensated for it, and are unlikely 
to receive the level of medical supervi-
sion afforded to closely monitored CHIM 
participants.
Payment caps can lead to attempts to 
circumvent the regulation. For example, 
many countries that prevent payment 
for the donation of blood plasma instead 
import it from the USA where payment 
is legal—the volume of the US export 
market for plasma products approaches 
$20 billion per year.ii Similarly, restrictions 
on CHIM trial payments may lead to an 
increase in trials in countries with less 
stringent regulation.
In practice, designing markets and 
payment schemes requires attention to 
the details of implementation. Here, we 
note that increasing hourly pay by a risk- 
compensation percentage as proposed 
in the target article provides compensa-
tion proportional to risk only if the risk 
increases proportionally with the number 
of hours worked. (Some risky tasks take 
little time; imagine challenge trials to test 
bulletproof vests.) To ensure that equal 
consequences are compensated with equal 
amounts across a wide variety of studies, 
we instead recommend a three- part 
contract consisting of: (1) salary for time 
involvement that is adjusted to account 
for the amount of discomfort experi-
enced during participation, (2) insurance 
against ex post adverse outcomes and (3) 
ex ante compensation for risks that cannot 
be compensated ex post (such as death). 
Such a scheme also increases transpar-
ency about what is requested from partic-
ipants and thus contributes to high- quality 
participation decisions.
Ethical judgement of payment in CHIM 
trials is partially based on predictions 
about the effects on prospective partici-
pants’ behaviour and about the quality of 
their decision making. These predictions 
can be tested empirically and interpreted 
through the lens of precise models of 
the underlying motivational and cogni-
tive mechanisms. Ambuehl2 for instance, 
employs controlled laboratory exper-
iments to study whether participation 
ii https://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/2020/05/
plasma-and-plasma-products-such-as.html.
incentives harm decision quality. While 
higher incentives make subjects more 
interested in learning about the upsides 
of the transaction and less interested in 
the downsides, such effects can arise from 
rational decision making; they do not 
necessarily indicate deficient reasoning. 
Indeed, direct measurements of subjects’ 
welfare in that experiment indicate no 
negative effect of participation incen-
tives across a wide variety of conditions. 
Accordingly, this study suggests that limits 
on payments are not justified if one takes 
subjects’ own objectives as the relevant 
normative standard.
That said, even rational decisions may 
raise ethical concerns. In fact, attentional 
mechanisms imply that high payments tend 
to disproportionately entice those individ-
uals who have more difficulty gathering 
information about the risks (Ambuehl et 
al.3). Absent informed consent require-
ments, these participants may be more 
likely to regret their decision ex post
Overall, the fact that payments can alter 
and possibly interfere with good decision 
making speaks to the need for robust 
informed consent, not against making 
appropriate payments. Indeed, survey 
respondents do not object to incentives 
per se, they object to participation that is 
based on an insufficient understanding of 
the personal consequences of participa-
tion (Ambuehl and Ockenfels4). Caps on 
payment may even impede well- informed 
decision making because study partici-
pants perceive the payment magnitude 
as a signal of risk (Cryder et al5). Low 
payments will lead such subjects to under-
estimate the risks, and may cause them 
to participate in trials they would rather 
avoid.
Finally, we applaud Grimwade et al1 for 
surveying both practitioners and members 
of the general population. We often know 
too little about how the views of profes-
sionals (both practitioners and advisors) 
compare with those of the populations 
with which they interact. Their finding that 
the general public does not share poten-
tial ethical concerns regarding payment of 
CHIM participants parallels the handful 
of existing surveys on the topic.6 7 Activ-
ities that depend on public participation 
require social support as well as ethical 
justification. Understanding the similari-
ties and differences between professional 
and popular judgements can help both 
to assess the likelihood of success, and to 
highlight issues about which communica-
tion between professional and public audi-
ences is particularly important.
There are many potential explanations 
for divergences of judgements between 
1Department of Economics, University of Zurich, Zurich, 
Switzerland
2Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Köln, 
Germany
3Department of Economics, Stanford University, 
Stanford, California, USA
Correspondence to Dr Alvin E. Roth, Department of 
Economics, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305, 
USA;  alroth@ stanford. edu
Commentary
i Kamakahi v. American Society for Reproductive 
Medicine, U.S. District Court Northern District 
of California, Case 3:11- cv-01781- JCS, 2016.
M
edizin (W
IB
6386). P
rotected by copyright.
 on N
ovem
ber 18, 2020 at D
eutschen Z
entralbibliothek fur
http://jm
e.bm
j.com
/
J M
ed E
thics: first published as 10.1136/m
edethics-2020-106891 on 28 O
ctober 2020. D
ow
nloaded from
 
2 Ambuehl S, et al. J Med Ethics Month 2020 Vol 0 No 0
Commentary
ethicists and the general public,8 including 
cognitive biases. For example, Ambuehl et 
al9 show that individuals tend to impose 
paternalistic restrictions on others as if they 
sought to align others’ choices with their 
own aspirations (projective paternalism). 
The effect arises because individuals are 
insufficiently aware of differences between 
themselves and others (false consensus). 
It is important to be aware of such biases, 
especially among highly trained and privi-
leged professionals who are dissimilar from 
the prospective study participants they 
hope to enlist, and whose decisions they 
seek to regulate. Indeed, in all areas where 
the question has been studied, experts such 
as financial advisors, CEOs, elected politi-
cians and economists, as well as philoso-
phers10 and physicians11 are as susceptible 
to cognitive biases as ordinary citizens.
The current discussion about payment 
in challenge trials is important because 
the potential benefits of well- designed 
challenge trials that could accelerate the 
development of safe and effective vaccines 
are enormous. Overall, economic research 
has shown, first, that ethical concerns 
over high payments may rely on intui-
tive predictions about behavioural effects 
that find little or no empirical support, 
and that the dangers of underpayment 
are at least as real as those of overpay-
ment. Second, a part of the ethics litera-
ture attaches significantly more weight 
to concerns of undue inducement than 
the general population. Accordingly, it 
appears to us that there is sufficient public 
support for preparing for challenge trials, 
with paid participants, without a need for 
excessive ethical concern that payments 
might inadvertently become too generous 
to trial participants.
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